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I. INTRODUCTION 
The men assigned to field crews are woken at five o’clock in the 
morning. When all of the crews are assembled, the men walk (sometimes 
miles) to the fields and start picking cotton on the 18,000 acre planta-
tion. The men are paid little, working mainly for their room and board. If 
they fail to pick enough cotton by the end of the day, they will be forced 
to work the fields all weekend. Everything is picked by hand, from the 
cotton and soybeans to the row crops of okra and tomatoes. The men 
work until the armed guards let them break for water, then they continue 
under the hot sun. Hundreds of primarily African-American men are 
forced to work the crops with minimal rest and meal breaks. Armed men 
on horseback ensure their compliance. 
 
This isn’t a story of slavery in the early 1800s or even sharecrop-
ping in the early 1900s. Any inmate assigned to “field duty” at one of 
many penal plantations across the South could have told this story in 
2011. In states such as Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, and Texas, inmates 
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are forced to recreate a practice outlawed in 1865—slavery.1 For exam-
ple, Louisiana State Penitentiary in Tunica, Louisiana was originally a 
slave plantation in the 1840s.2 It was—and is still—familiarly named 
“Angola,” reportedly because the best slaves came from that African 
country.3 As recently as 1979, inmates were referred to as “hands”4 in the 
fields, reminiscent of how masters referred to their slaves before the Civ-
il War.5 
This Article argues that the Thirteenth Amendment allows forced 
inmate labor only when the labor approximates the conditions of invol-
untary servitude, rather than conditions of slavery. There are critical dif-
ferences between “slavery” and “involuntary servitude.” One of the most 
important differences, as described by Orlando Patterson, is that slavery 
imposes “social death” upon the enslaved by excluding them from socie-
ty through ritual, cultural, and legal means.6 
And yet, courts and society in general have failed to critically eval-
uate this re-creation of slavery within the prison walls.7 In modern juris-
prudence, there are few exceptions to the rule that prisoners may be 
forced to work. Indeed, the Thirteenth Amendment’s ban on slavery and 
involuntary servitude contains an exception for those individuals con-
victed of a crime. But this lack of critical attention to labor practices be-
hind prison walls stems from confusion between the terms involuntary 
servitude and slavery. And the danger of slavery is not just a relic of the 
                                                 
 1. See ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2010 2 
(2010), http://adc.arkansas.gov/resources/Documents/Annual_Report_FY2010.pdf (detailing crops 
and farm operation); Robbie Brown & Kim Severson, Enlisting Prison Labor to Close Budget Gaps, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011, A16, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/25/us/25inmates. 
html?pagewanted=all (picking row crops of collard greens in Florida); LOUISIANA STATE 
PENITENTIARY, ANNUAL REPORT 2009–2010 (2010), http://www.corrections.state.la.us/LSP/docs/ 
2010_Annual_Report.pdf (noting the majority of maximum- and medium-security inmates are kept 
“constructively active” working farm lines eight hours a day for five days a week); ROBERT 
PERKINSON, TEXAS TOUGH: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S PRISON EMPIRE 6 (2010) (detailing history and 
operation of Texas state prisons and concluding, “Nowhere else in turn-of-the-millennium America 
could one witness gangs of African American men filling cotton sacks under the watchful eyes of 
armed whites on horseback.”). 
 2. Wilbert Rideau, In the Field, THE ANGOLITE, Sept./Oct. 1979, at 53. 
 3. DENNIS SHERE, CAIN’S REDEMPTION 41 (2005). 
 4. Rideau, supra note 2, at 53. 
 5. Id.; see also Blake McKelvey, Penal Slavery and Southern Reconstruction, 20 J. NEGRO 
HIST. 153, 160 (1935). 
 6. ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 51–62 (1982). 
 7. For a broader discussion of the similarities between prisons in general and slavery, see 
ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 22–39 (2003) (discussing how the penitentiary system 
adopted many of the same punishments as slavery, such as whipping); see also R. L. Krebs, Blood 
Took Penitentiary “Out of Red,” NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE 2:4–5 (May 11, 1941), reprinted 
in BURK FOSTER ET AL., THE WALL IS STRONG: CORRECTIONS IN LOUISIANA 33 (1995) (reporting 
that inmates at Angola were “beaten in cane, rice and vegetable fields with five-foot clubs, redou-
bled grass ropes, blacksnake whips . . .”). 
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past.8 States facing growing budget deficits are increasingly turning to 
inmate labor to produce additional revenue, or at a minimum, offset the 
cost of imprisonment.9 The latest data available indicate that as of 2002, 
the Federal Bureau of Prisons and twenty-eight states had prisoners la-
boring in agriculture.10 
This Article argues that society must critically examine the types of 
labor we require our inmates to perform and prohibit the imposition of 
slavery, even when the enslaved is an inmate. Part II focuses on the text 
and history of Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment11 and argues that 
the Amendment’s exception allowing forced inmate labor is not as broad 
as it first appears. Part III examines the Eighth Amendment and how the 
imposition of slave status on inmates should be considered cruel and un-
usual punishment. Lastly, Part IV applies these concepts to the history 
and operation of one such penal plantation—Louisiana State Peniten-
tiary. This Article concludes by cautioning legislatures and prison war-
dens to be more cognizant of the inherent harms in selecting certain types 
                                                 
 8. This Article builds upon the critical and important work by Michelle Alexander in her book, 
THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). While Alex-
ander looks at the prison system as a whole and equates its operation and outcomes with Jim Crow 
practices of the past, this Article focuses on just one element of the prison system and argues that 
forced inmate labor, under certain conditions, is itself slavery. 
 9. Brown & Severson, supra note 1, at A16. 
 10. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INST., CORRECTIONS YEARBOOK (2002). This is the last year that the 
corrections yearbook was published, and there are no other authoritative sources specifically collect-
ing data on the assignment of state prisoners to agricultural labor. 
 11. A full discussion of Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, commonly referred to as the 
enforcement provision, is beyond the scope of this Article. It is worth noting, however, that even if 
certain forms of penal plantation labor are not considered slavery itself, penal plantation labor may 
still be considered a “badge” of slavery and therefore subject to congressional prohibition. Under 
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, “Congress shall have power to enforce this article by ap-
propriate legislation.” But determining what practices constitute a “badge or incident” of slavery is 
not particularly clear and is the subject of much academic debate. See, e.g., George Rutherglen, State 
Action, Private Action, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367, 1368 (2008). At its 
core, a badge of slavery is “any practice connected with slavery as it was practiced in this country.” 
Id. at 1400. The badge or incident of slavery line of cases, beginning with the Civil Rights Cases 
holding that racial discrimination in public accommodations was not a badge of slavery, centers on 
congressional power to legislate and not on what is actually prohibited under the terms of Section 1 
of the Thirteenth Amendment. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1883); see also Jones 
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). As George Rutherglen notes, “The badges and inci-
dents of slavery are intermediate in both a conceptual and an instrumental sense. Conceptually, they 
constitute the components of slavery; instrumentally, eliminating them one-by-one serves the ulti-
mate goal of eradicating slavery itself.” Rutherglen, supra, at 1397–98. Only actual slavery (includ-
ing most if not all of its associated practices) is prohibited under Section 1 and subject to judicial 
enforcement. To prohibit penal plantation labor as a badge of slavery, Congress would have to spe-
cifically find that the labor is an extension of or a practice associated with slavery and therefore 
prohibited. Rutherglen, supra, at 1393. 
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of labor for inmates and will hopefully spark a broader public discussion 
on when inmate labor may be another form of slavery.12 
II. THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT: SLAVERY, INVOLUNTARY 
SERVITUDE, AND THE CONVICT-LABOR EXCEPTION 
Not only does the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
prohibit involuntary labor writ large but it also includes an exception for 
penal servitude. Specifically, the Thirteenth Amendment states: “Neither 
slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”13 The Punish-
ment Clause or “prisoner-labor exception clause” is often misinterpreted 
to allow both conditions of slavery and involuntary servitude as a pun-
ishment for a crime.14 
A. Textual Analysis 
Textually, the convict exception to the Thirteenth Amendment ap-
plies only to conditions of involuntary servitude and not to slavery. The 
rule of last the antecedent, a canon of judicial interpretation, requires that 
a clause “should ordinarily be read as modifying only the noun or phrase 
that it immediately follows.”15 This canon, however, may be applied 
                                                 
 12. This Article does not examine whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments provide any additional limitations on penal plantation labor. The analyses for 
the Eighth and Thirteenth Amendments focus on the type of labor as the primary variable, whereas 
the Fourteenth Amendment focuses first on the specific group most impacted. In addition, a Four-
teenth Amendment analysis would require data on the assignment of prison labor by job—data the 
author has to date been unable to pry loose from the Louisiana Department of Corrections. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend XIII, § 1 (emphasis added). This exception for penal labor was af-
firmed in dicta by the U.S. Supreme Court. United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149–50 (1914) 
(invalidating peonage policies in which a convicted inmate concluded a labor contract with a private 
party in exchange for payment of court-assessed fines and fees). 
 14. See, e.g., Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F.2d 1335, 1338 (7th Cir. 1973) (stating that“[t]he Thir-
teenth Amendment, if read literally, suggests that the States may treat their prisoners as slaves,” but 
noting that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments mitigate this harsh interpretation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment); Kamal Ghali, No Slavery Except as Punishment for Crime: The Punishment 
Clause and Sexual Slavery, 55 UCLA L. REV. 607, 608 (2008); Scott Howe, Slavery as Punishment, 
51 ARIZ. L. REV. 983, 987–90 (2009) (“[T]he [Thirteenth] Amendment authorized as punishment for 
crime the very horror it otherwise prohibited.”). But see Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 293 
(1897) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“[S]lavery cannot exist in any form within the United States . . . . As 
to involuntary servitude, it may exist in the United States; but it can only exist lawfully as a punish-
ment for crime of which the party shall have been duly convicted. Such is the plain readings of the 
constitution.”). 
 15. Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 26 (2003). The comma exception to the rule of the last 
antecedent is a grammatical rule and requires that where a restrictive clause, in this case the prison-
er-labor exception, is separated from the preceding noun or phrase with a comma, the restrictive 
clause applies to all previous antecedents. See In re Lehman Bros. Mortgage-Backed Securities 
Litigation, 650 F.3d 167, 176 (2nd Cir. 2011) (applying the exception to note that distribution of 
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flexibly and subordinate to other interpretation principles, such as elimi-
nating absurdities and nullities and reading the statute as a whole.16 
Applying the rule of last the antecedent to the convict-labor excep-
tion raises the question of whether the exception modifies slavery and 
involuntary servitude or only the term involuntary servitude. In other 
words, what exactly is counted as the preceding noun or phrase? One 
court has noted that when terms are separated by a disjunctive conjunc-
tion (such as “or”) and the last term is followed by a modifying clause, 
then the modifying clause applies only to the last term and not the term 
preceding the disjunctive conjunction.17 The convict-labor exception is 
immediately preceded by “neither slavery nor involuntary servitude.” 
“Nor” is considered a disjunctive conjunction,18 and accordingly, the 
convict-labor exception should apply only to conditions of servitude and 
not to conditions of slavery. 
Furthermore, an interpretation of the convict-labor exception that 
applies to both slavery and involuntary servitude leads to a legal absurdi-
ty. Such a reading of the Amendment perversely implies that rather than 
abolish slavery in its entirety, the government abolished only private 
slavery, while monopolizing and sanctioning government-imposed slav-
ery.19 This interpretation is squarely at odds with the intent of Congress 
at the time, as evidenced in the debates preceding the adoption of the 
Thirteenth Amendment. 
B. Historical Analysis 
Historically, the terms slavery and involuntary servitude were not 
synonymous. From the beginning of colonization, there was a difference 
in status between the two terms. The language of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment was simply borrowed from prior federal enactments and therefore 
                                                                                                             
securities modifies all previous antecedents of those who purchase, offer, or sell securities). But the 
comma exception applies only when the previous antecedents are themselves separated by a comma. 
Hughes v. Samedan Oil Corp., 166 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1948) (“It is said in that connection that 
no comma must be placed between restrictive clauses and that which they restrict; that a restrictive 
clause must be set off by a comma only when it refers to several antecedents which are themselves 
separated by a comma.”) (emphasis added). The terms slavery and involuntary servitude are not 
themselves separated by a comma, and therefore, the comma exception does not apply. 
 16. United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415, 425–26 (2009) (noting the limited application of the 
rule of the last antecedent when other indicia of meaning are available to interpret a statute). 
 17. See Spradlin v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 34 S.W.3d 578, 581 (Tex. 2000). 
 18. WEBSTER’S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 426 (1913) defines “disjunctive conjunc-
tion” as “one connecting grammatically two words or clauses, expressing at the same time an oppo-
sition or separation inherent in the notions or thoughts; as, either, or, neither, nor, but, although, 
except, lest, etc.” 
 19. But see Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (1 Gratt) 790, 796 (1871) (noting an inmate is 
“civilly dead” and a “slave of the State”). 
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not a matter of great debate prior to adoption. Nevertheless, through the 
submission of alternate wordings and subsequent actions by Congress to 
address discriminatory state laws designed to resubordinate former 
slaves, it becomes clear that the early colonial distinction between the 
two terms continued. 
Leon Higginbotham contends that Africans were initially brought to 
the American colonies as involuntary-indentured servants.20 Although 
the terms “buying” and “selling” were used to refer to indentured serv-
ants, the terms referred only to the buying of services for a specific peri-
od of time, and not in regard to ownership of another individual.21 Cer-
tainly for Africans, the terminology was less salient because most could 
not speak, read, or write English, and therefore, their “services” were 
often sold for life.22 Not until the mid-1600s, according to Higginbotham, 
did slavery formally diverge as an institution different from indentured 
servitude on American soil.23 Indentured servitude became the status of 
white servants and slavery the status for Africans.24 Thus, well before 
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, the terms slavery and involun-
tary servitude referred to distinct practices. 
The language of Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment, including 
the prisoner-labor exception, was first used in the Northwest Ordinance. 
The Northwest Ordinance, passed by the Continental Congress and reen-
acted in 1789 by the First Congress, was a template for agreements limit-
ing or abolishing slavery in the upper reaches of the Louisiana Purchase 
territory (the “Missouri Compromise”) and in the District of Columbia.25 
Article 6 of the Northwest Ordinance provided the following: “There 
shall be neither Slavery nor involuntary Servitude in the said territory 
otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the Party shall have 
been duly convicted.”26 In later debates on the Thirteenth Amendment, 
Senator Sumner, an advocate of abolition, argued that the Northwest Or-
dinance’s punishment clause was intended to recognize the right of states 
to continue the practice of imprisoning debtors for labor.27 
                                                 
 20. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, SHADES OF FREEDOM 18 (1996). But note that although treated 
as such, their period of servitude was likely for as long as desired or even life, since Africans, arriv-
ing involuntarily, were likely sold without a written contract specifying a period of service. Id. at 19. 
 21. Id. at 18. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 18–20. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Rutherglen, supra note 11, at 1372–74. 
 26. HENRY STEEL COMMAGER & MILTON CANTOR, DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 128 
(10th ed. 1988). 
 27. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1488 (1864). 
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There is little congressional documentation surrounding the drafting 
and debate of Section 1.28 For example, there are no records of the de-
bates occurring within the Senate Judiciary Committee—the committee 
that produced the text as adopted.29 Instead, the majority of concerns 
voiced during the recorded debates by the full Senate centered on the 
authority of the federal government to enact the Amendment, the power 
of Congress to enforce the Amendment under Section 2, and a late pro-
posal by Senator Sumner to replace the committee’s proposed text with 
language foreshadowing the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.30 
On the other hand, the debates and discussion leading up to the 
adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, to the extent that they related to 
the Punishment Clause, do indicate a recognized difference between in-
voluntary servitude and slavery. For instance, in December 1863, Repre-
sentative Ashley proposed that the Thirteenth Amendment should read, 
“Slavery being incompatible with a free government is forever prohibited 
in the United States, and involuntary servitude shall be permitted only as 
a punishment for a crime.”31 His proposed text provides a distinction be-
tween the two practices and clearly limits the penalty of criminal convic-
tion to involuntary servitude. Similarly, Ashley’s proposed text mirrored 
amendments to state constitutions in Kansas and Iowa, which both ex-
plicitly prohibited slavery and used independent clauses to allow invol-
untary servitude as punishment for a crime.32 
The proposal by the Senate Judiciary Committee, however, repro-
duced the language found in previous federal documents limiting or abol-
ishing slavery, such as the Northwest Ordinance. The text proposed by 
the Senate Judiciary Committee and eventually adopted by the Senate 
read, “Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment 
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist 
                                                 
 28. See Jacobus tenBroek, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: 
Consummation to Abolition and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 174 
(1951) (noting that the primary issue of debate was the scope of federal authority under the proposed 
Thirteenth Amendment). 
 29. Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 
437, 449 n.64 (1989). 
 30. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1488. 
 31. The bill was actually co-authored by Representative James M. Ashley and the co-chair of 
the House Judiciary Committee, Representative James Wilson. See HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM 
M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1835–1875 384 
(1982); Howe, supra note 14, at 993; tenBroek, supra note 28, at 173–77. 
 32. See Howe, supra note 14, at 994 n.90 (Iowa: “There shall be no slavery in this state; nor 
shall there be involuntary servitude, unless for the punishment of crime.”; Kansas: “There shall be 
no slavery in this State; and no involuntary servitude, except for the punishment of crime, whereof 
the party shall have been duly convicted.”). 
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within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”33 The 
Punishment Clause in the proposed text did not elicit great debate. In-
deed, the only recorded challenge to the Punishment Clause language 
came from Senator Sumner, who preferred an amendment that would 
recognize the equality of all persons before the law.34 
Congressional action after the adoption of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment further supports both arguments that slavery and involuntary servi-
tude are distinct, and that only involuntary servitude may be imposed as 
punishment for a crime. Congress passed the Thirteenth Amendment on 
January 31, 1865, and the states ratified it on December 6, 1865.35 In re-
sponse, ten of the former slave states enacted a series of discriminatory 
criminal laws, known as the “Black Codes,” to recreate slavery in all but 
name.36 These laws, though enacted by different states, created a legal 
structure to maintain the subordination of African-Americans.37 In par-
ticular, the new laws ensured a steady supply of labor though the con-
vict-labor exception to the Thirteenth Amendment.38 The Black Codes 
created new offenses, such as “insolent gesture” or “malicious mischief,” 
that deliberately targeted African-Americans.39 Sentences were statutori-
                                                 
 33. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1488 (emphasis added). Compare U.S. CONST. 
AMEND. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime 
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place 
subject to their jurisdiction.”), with NORTHWEST ORDINANCE OF 1787 § 14, art. VI, reprinted in 
COMMAGER & CANTOR, supra note 26, at 128 (“There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servi-
tude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted.”). 
 34. CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1488. Howe draws heavily on this portion of the 
debate to argue that Congress knew it was creating slavery as a punishment upon conviction. Howe, 
supra note 14, at 995. Howe later argues that the availability of alternative language (in state consti-
tutions, but not federal law) and the absence of legal challenges to the slavery status of prisoners 
under penal plantations and convict-leasing support his interpretation. Id. at 1021–26. I disagree. 
Although Sumner posits slavery as punishment as a textual possibility under the Senate Judiciary 
Committee draft, given his oratorical style and his outspoken and clear opposition to slavery, the 
context of his arguments indicate that he would prefer a positivist approach to ending slavery (i.e., 
that guaranteed certain rights to all), instead of a prohibitory approach (i.e., forbidding the practice). 
Of particular importance are the responses to Sumner’s stated possibility, none of which focused on 
the particular language of the Clause but rather on his counterproposal of a positivist approach. 
CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 1487–88. 
 35. ALAN GRIMES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 39 (1978); 
James M. McPherson, In Pursuit of Constitutional Abolitionism, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY 32–
33 (Alexander Tsesis ed., 2010) (discussing the politics of passage and ratification). 
 36. William Wiecek, Emancipation and Civic Status: The American Experience 1865–1915, in 
THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY, supra note 35, at 84. For an excellent and in-depth analysis of convict-
lease programs and the use of Black Codes to create a steady labor supply, see generally DAVID M. 
OSHINSKY, WORSE THAN SLAVERY (1997). 
 37. Wiecek, supra note 36, at 89. 
 38. See OSHINSKY, supra note 36, at 20–22. 
 39. Wiecek, supra note 36, at 85. 
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ly extended or even newly created for misdemeanor offenses.40 Due pro-
cess protections were summarily dispensed with, and the state became 
the largest “owner” of able-bodied men.41 As such, the state would auc-
tion inmates off to the highest private bidder under the “convict-lease” 
program.42 “[T]he southern leasing systems that arose after 1865 were 
unprecedented in the number of prisoners involved, in the heavy use of 
black prisoners and in the nearly unfettered control given to the leasing 
parties.”43 In turn, Douglas Blackmon wrote that during the post-Civil 
War period, these leasing parties subjected the leased convicts to the 
same types of punishment formerly meted out to slaves (e.g, whipping 
and branding).44 
The use of the Punishment Clause to resubordinate the formerly en-
slaved was not the intended effect of the Thirteenth Amendment. For 
example, Representative Kasson argued that the “only kind of involun-
tary servitude known to the Constitution and the law” was when a pris-
oner was directly sentenced to hard labor in the state prison under the 
control of state officers.45 In response to the abuses of the convict-lease 
system, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to specifically 
cure these—and other—abuses.46 
Despite the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, some courts equated 
prisoners with slaves. For example, in 1870, the Virginia Supreme Court 
in Ruffin v. Commonwealth declared prisoners, by virtue of their incar-
ceration, “civilly dead.”47 Specifically, the court notoriously concluded: 
For the time being, during his term of service in the penitentiary, he 
is in a state of penal servitude to the State. He has, as a consequence 
of his crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights 
except those which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for 
the time being the slave of the State.48 
The Ruffin case, decided only five years after ratification of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, clearly conflated the status of slavery with involun-
tary servitude. Although the opinion glaringly did not mention Ruffin’s 
                                                 
 40. BARBARA ESPOSITO & JOE WOODS, PRISON SLAVERY 101 (1982). 
 41. DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME 67 (2008); ESPOSITO & WOODS, 
supra note 40, at 101–03. 
 42. BLACKMON, supra note 41, at 67. 
 43. Howe, supra note 14, at 1009. 
 44. BLACKMON, supra note 41, at 8, 56. 
 45. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 2ND SESS. 345–46 (1867). 
 46. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 2, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1981–1982 (1991)) (providing for a series of legal rights, including the rights to make and en-
force contracts, and to sue and be sued). 
 47. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790, 796 (1871). 
 48. Id. (emphasis added). 
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race, newspaper reports at the time indicate that Mr. Ruffin was an Afri-
can-American prisoner.49 The Civil War had ended only five years prior 
to the Ruffin decision. Faced with an African-American defendant just a 
few years after emancipation, and still influenced by the racial legacy of 
slavery, the Virginia Supreme Court could see Mr. Ruffin as only a 
slave. 
Since Ruffin, courts routinely have failed to properly distinguish in-
voluntary servitude from slavery.50 Although courts have taken pains to 
distance themselves from the Ruffin opinion,51 their efforts have not 
translated into a clear understanding of the differences between these two 
terms. In the Slaughter-House Cases, one of the first cases to examine 
the Thirteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Thir-
teenth Amendment applied to all forms of slavery, not just “African slav-
ery.”52 The Court appears to recognize a distinction between the two 
terms, noting that if “Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor sys-
tem shall develop slavery of the Mexican or Chinese race . . . this 
amendment may safely be trusted to make void.”53  
In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Court defined slavery as a “le-
galized social relation” and just as quickly found that slavery was over 
following the Civil War.54 This vague definition of slavery, however, 
was accompanied by a broad definition of involuntary servitude. “Servi-
                                                 
 49. Commutation of Sentence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1872, at 3. Ruffin was initially imprisoned 
for “assault with intent to kill” and sentenced to five years. Id. While leased to contractors outside 
penitentiary walls, Ruffin allegedly shot a guard while attempting to escape and was sentenced to 
death. Id. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Id. The Governor of 
Virginia subsequently commuted his sentence to life imprisonment. Id. 
 50. See, e.g., Ali v. Johnson, 259 F.3d 317, 317 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that “inmates sen-
tenced to incarceration cannot state a viable Thirteenth Amendment claim if the prison system re-
quires them to work” without distinguishing that an inmate could challenge the constitutionality of 
slave labor); Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 500–01 (7th Cir. 1999) (dismissing as frivolous 
prisoners’ claims that transfer to a private prison for labor violated the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 51. See, e.g., Washlefske v. Winston, 60 F. Supp. 2d 534, 539 (E.D. Va. 1999), aff’d, 234 F.3d 
179 (4th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he idea expressed by the court in Ruffin, that inmates are no more than 
‘slaves of the State,’ has been repeatedly and expressly repudiated by other courts.”); United States 
ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir. 1973) (Circuit Judge—and future Supreme 
Court Justice—Stevens wrote, “[T]he view once held that an inmate is a mere slave is now totally 
rejected. The restraints and the punishment which a criminal conviction entails do not place the 
citizen beyond the ethical tradition that accords respect to the dignity and intrinsic worth of every 
individual.”). 
 52. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872) (holding Louisiana statute creating 
monopoly on authority to stable and slaughter livestock did not violate the Constitution). 
 53. Id. at 72. 
 54. Id. at 68. The Court seemed at pains to argue that slavery caused the Civil War, but as the 
war is over, slavery is over as a result. Even in 1872, the horrors of the war, and perhaps fear about 
the recurrence of war among the states, underlie the Court’s quick burial of slavery as an institution. 
But see BLACKMON, supra note 41, at 7–8 (arguing that slavery continued long after formal emanci-
pation by the Thirteenth Amendment). 
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tude,” the Court held, is “of a larger meaning than slavery” and includes 
“all shades and conditions of African slavery.”55 For example, the Court 
claimed that “apprenticeship for long terms, as it had been practiced in 
the West India Islands, . . . or . . . reducing the slaves to the condition of 
serfs attached to the plantation” would have been constitutional if Sec-
tion 1 prohibited only slavery and not involuntary servitude.56 There is 
obvious confusion in the use of the terms “slaves” and “serfs.” The Court 
implied a difference in the quality of bondage—that serfdom is a worse 
state of being than slavery.57 At the same time, the Court appeared to 
designate chattel slavery as the worst state of being, and involuntary ser-
vitude as a lesser form of chattel slavery.58 The Slaughter-House Cases, 
rather than providing a judicial framework for recognizing instances of 
slavery, instead provide very little insight into what conditions constitute 
slavery. The case appears to teach that slavery exists (and is therefore 
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment) only when the master calls it 
slavery. 
Just a few years later, the Court again confronted the definition of 
slavery and involuntary servitude in the Civil Rights Cases.59 While the 
Court indicated that it knew what slavery was, it failed to define the 
term.60 Instead, the Court concentrated on specific incidents of slavery, 
such as compulsory service, inability to hold property, lack of standing in 
court, and prohibitions against being a witness against a “white per-
son.”61 Nor did the Court meaningfully distinguish between the terms 
involuntary servitude and slavery. The Court, for example, failed to iden-
tify whether any specific circumstances apply to involuntary servitude. 
Although the opinion focused primarily on the extent of congressional 
authority to enact a law prohibiting racial discrimination under the en-
forcement provisions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, the 
Court continued to gloss over the distinctions between the two terms. 
The question before the Court in the Civil Rights Cases was wheth-
er Congress, under Section 2 of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s enforcement provisions, had authority to pass the Civil Rights 
Act of 1875, making it illegal to discriminate on the basis of race.62 The 
Civil Rights Act prohibited discrimination in the provision of public 
                                                 
 55. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 69. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. (“reducing slaves to conditions of serfs . . .”). 
 58. Id. 
 59. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 60. See id. at 23–25. 
 61. Id. at 22. 
 62. Id. 
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transportation and accommodation.63 Without illuminating the difference 
between the two terms, the Court simply held, 
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it 
apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit to 
make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he will 
take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theater or 
deal with in other matters of intercourse or business.64 
This trend of failing to distinguish between the two conditions of 
slavery and involuntary servitude continued in a series of cases through 
the modern era. For example, in Plessy v. Ferguson, the Court held that 
segregation of races on trains did not imply slavery or involuntary servi-
tude.65 Most of the cases in the early-twentieth century focused solely on 
involuntary servitude.66 For example, the Court in Bailey v. Alabama 
held an Alabama statute unconstitutional under the Thirteenth Amend-
ment because the law created the condition of involuntary servitude by 
requiring labor to repay a previously owed debt.67 
In the mid- to late-twentieth century, Thirteenth Amendment cases 
focused on the enforcement powers of Congress under Section 2. In 
Jones v. Mayer, the first case contemplating an expanded role for con-
gressional action, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1982, barring private 
and public racial discrimination, was a “valid exercise of the power of 
Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.”68 Despite a series of 
cases centered on the rights created by the Thirteenth Amendment, the 
Court has provided little guidance on understanding how slavery and 
involuntary servitude are actually different. 
At most, courts have incorporated the American memory of slavery 
and have failed to provide a broader framework for understanding and 
distinguishing the terms slavery and involuntary servitude.69 While the 
American memory, or narrative, of slavery plays an important role in 
recognizing slavery, it does little to help us distinguish slavery from oth-
er conditions. Moreover, involuntary servitude is a much more nebulous 
                                                 
 63. Id. at 23. 
 64. Id. at 24–25 (emphasis added). 
 65. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542, 548 (1896) (holding that the “separate but equal” 
doctrine is constitutional under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
 66. See, e.g., Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 9 (1944) (noting that peonage is involuntary 
servitude); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S 328, 333 (1916) (finding that forced labor to repair roads near 
one’s own residence without compensation is not involuntary servitude); Clyatt v. United States, 197 
U.S. 207, 215 (1905) (noting that peonage is involuntary servitude). 
 67. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 244–45 (1911). 
 68. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968). 
 69. See Julie Chi-Hye Suk, Equal by Comparison: Unsettling Assumptions of Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 55 AM. J. COMP. L. 295, 327–31 (2007). 
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concept in American history and therefore harder to identify. According-
ly, courts have refused to examine allegations of slavery behind prison 
walls, instead construing such claims as involuntary servitude and there-
fore constitutionally permitted.70 For example, the Fifth Circuit rejected a 
prisoner’s claim that forced labor without compensation violated his 
Thirteenth Amendment rights.71 But instead of engaging in a deeper 
analysis of his claim, the Court preferred to apply “the Thirteenth 
Amendment precisely as it is written.”72 
The actual text, the history, and the Court’s jurisprudence all con-
sistently, with few exceptions, explicitly recognize—but fail to concrete-
ly articulate—a difference between the terms slavery and involuntary 
servitude. One explanation for this failure to differentiate is that the dis-
tinction between the two terms is practically meaningless in the majority 
of Thirteenth Amendment claims. Many of the initial cases brought un-
der Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment were not on behalf of actual 
slaves or prisoners. Instead, the initial Thirteenth Amendment cases con-
cerned, for example, butchers or owners of restaurants or public accom-
modations.73 Both types of status—slavery and involuntary servitude—
are forbidden, and therefore, nonprisoner plaintiffs suing for redress need 
to prove only one or the other. Courts, in providing or denying redress, 
are required to find only one of the above factors. The differences be-
tween the two are immaterial if a nonprisoner plaintiff only needs to 
prove either condition. 
Second, the courts and the public have relied too extensively on the 
legally formalistic notion of slavery as legal ownership. Courts have as-
sumed that slavery is not claimed in Thirteenth Amendment challenges 
to forced labor.74 In part, this assumption results from the contested dis-
course on race and racial history in the United States. By safely tucking 
slavery away as a long-dead practice, issues of persistent socioeconomic 
                                                 
 70. See, e.g., Van Hoorelbeke v. Hawk, No. 95-2291, 1995 WL 676041, at *4 (7th Cir. Nov. 9, 
1995) (dismissing a prisoner’s claim of being made a slave as noncognizable under the Thirteenth 
Amendment, and noting that the prisoner has “no rights” under the Thirteenth Amendment); Draper 
v. Rhay, 315 F.2d 193, 197 (9th Cir. 1963) (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment simply does not 
apply inside the prison walls but also restricting its analysis to involuntary servitude); Mitchell v. 
San Jose Immigration & Customs Enforcement Dir., No. C 07-3843 SI (pr), 2007 WL 2746745, at 
*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2007) (dismissing Mitchell’s claim that he is forced to engage in slave labor 
because the Thirteenth Amendment allows for involuntary servitude by those duly convicted). 
 71. Wendt v. Lynaugh, 841 F.2d 619, 620 (5th Cir. 1988). 
 72. Id. at 621. 
 73. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20–21 (1883); The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 
36, 69 (1872). 
 74. See, e.g., Ali v. Johnson, 259 F.3d 317, 317 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[I]nmates sentenced to incar-
ceration cannot state a viable Thirteenth Amendment claim if the prison system requires them to 
work.”). 
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inequality center not on history but on the personal characteristics asso-
ciated with certain racial groups. 
In sum, Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence indicates a difference 
between the terms slavery and involuntary servitude. Both the Amend-
ment text and dicta in the jurisprudence, with few exceptions, confirm 
that only involuntary servitude may be imposed for punishment of a 
crime. But while acknowledging the distinction, judges and society have 
failed to give meaning to the content of the terms slavery and involuntary 
servitude. 
C. Distinguishing Involuntary Servitude and Slavery 
The distinctions between slavery and involuntary servitude become 
meaningful when applied to prison labor. All prisoners duly convicted 
may be forced to work against their will.75 Indeed, penal labor was ini-
tially conceived in the late-seventeenth century as an alternative to other 
methods of punishment, like death and branding.76 In the modern era, 
many justify prison labor because it enhances the prospect of rehabilita-
tion by providing training in job skills and fostering a sense of responsi-
bility and duty.77 For example, the U.S. Catholic Conference has empha-
sized the importance of meaningful prison-work opportunities that en-
hance human dignity for restorative justice and rehabilitation.78 Even if 
prison labor fails to reach the lofty goals of the Catholic Conference, 
there is still an expectation that prison labor will “drain ‘the filthy puddle 
of idleness.’”79 Prison labor, for both rehabilitative and punishment pur-
poses, is perceived as normatively good. 
Most types of prison labor will approximate conditions of involun-
tary servitude and thereby become permissible under the convict-labor 
exception of the Thirteenth Amendment and under society’s general ex-
                                                 
 75. For analysis of the meaning of “punishment” as applied to nonconvicted prisoners and 
forced labor, see Raja Raghunath, A Promise the Nation Cannot Keep: What Prevents the Applica-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment in Prison?, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 395, 435–43 (2009). For 
a historical approach comparing the rights of prisoners (under conditions of involuntary servitude) 
and the greater rights and protections associated with workers, see Leroy D. Clark & Gwendolyn M. 
Parker, The Labor Law Problems of the Prisoner, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 840 (1975). 
 76. Clark & Parker, supra note 75, at 841. 
 77. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, More Warehouses, or Factories With Fences?, 8 NEW ENG. J. 
ON PRISON L. 111, 111 (1982); Michelle S. Phelps, Rehabilitation in the Punitive Era: The Gap 
Between Rhetoric and Reality in U.S. Prison Programs, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 33, 38–39 (2011). 
 78. See William P. Quigley, Prison Work, Wages, and Catholic Social Thought: Justice De-
mands Decent Work for Decent Wages, Even for Prisoners, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1159, 1168–
74 (2007). 
 79. Stephen P. Garvey, Freeing Prisoners’ Labor, 50 STAN. L. REV. 339, 346 (1998). 
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pectation for punishment.80 Other types of labor, however, may approxi-
mate conditions of slavery. In such cases, the prisoner’s enslavement is 
an anathema to the Constitution and to society’s principles of human 
dignity. 
Chattel slavery, as practiced in the United States, is the clearest 
form of slavery, but there is significant disagreement on whether slavery 
encompasses more than just chattel slavery. Lea VanderVelde, in her 
arguments for an expanded and aspirational Thirteenth Amendment, re-
jects the three primary interpretations of the term slavery as “limita-
tions.”81 She argues that slavery heretofore has been interpreted narrowly 
to apply only to conditions (1) coerced by violence; (2) of legal owner-
ship in the person by another; or (3) of lesser liberty entitlements than 
free men.82 Indeed, chattel slavery is a legally formalistic approach to 
slavery and has been the dominant understanding of slavery internation-
ally.83 Nevertheless, most scholars would agree that while slavery and 
involuntary servitude may share many characteristics, the practice of 
slavery has distinct and unique harms beyond the involuntary nature of 
the labor performed.84 
Involuntary servitude is, at its core, forced labor for the benefit of 
another.85 Such labor may be compelled by physical force or coerced. 
Coercion must amount to the laborer justifiably believing he has no 
choice but to perform the ordered work.86 Such coercion may, but need 
not necessarily, be physical. The classic example of involuntary servi-
tude is the system of peonage, whereby the poor were forced to labor 
                                                 
 80. Angela Davis, among others, has argued for the “abolition” of the prisoner-labor excep-
tions found in both the Thirteenth Amendment and state constitutions. She argues that the exception 
was intended to recreate slavery and therefore is indelibly tainted and the exception continues to 
propagate slavery in modern times, particularly during the current era of mass incarceration. See 
Angela Y. Davis, From the Convict Lease System to the Super-Max Prison, in STATES OF 
CONFINEMENT: POLICING, DETENTION, AND PRISON 60 (Joy James ed., 2000); see also ESPOSITO & 
WOODS, supra note 40, at 3–6 (1982) (summarizing the argument that the prisoner-labor exception is 
simply slavery by other means and the exception should therefore be removed from the Thirteenth 
Amendment). 
 81. Lea VanderVelde, The Thirteenth Amendment of Our Aspirations, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 885, 
860 (2007). 
 82. Id.  
 83. See infra Part III.B discussion of international law on slavery. 
 84. See, e.g., Stanley L. Engerman, Slavery at Different Times and Places, AM. HIS. REV. 480, 
480–81 (2000) (noting the difficulties of definition and delineation between slavery and nonslavery 
practices, but acknowledging that the harms accompanying slavery are invariably greater than simi-
lar, nonslave practices). 
 85. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment 
to “prohibit[] that control by which the personal service of one man is disposed of or coerced for 
another’s benefit”). 
 86. See Wicks v. S. Pac. Co., 231 F.2d 130, 138 (9th Cir. 1956). 
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until their debt was satisfied.87 More recently, examples include claims 
of involuntary servitude against human trafficking, the denial of abortion 
services,88 racial profiling, and rape.89 In this sense, involuntary servitude 
is broader than the practice of slavery. 
It could be argued that the key difference between slavery and in-
voluntary servitude is that slavery status attaches for life, but involuntary 
servitude for only a definite period of time. This supposed distinction, 
however, is meaningless when we consider the purpose behind a future 
possibility of freedom. Involuntary servitude need not necessarily be for 
life but rather may exist for a few days, months, or years. The framers of 
the Amendment referred to the practice of indentured apprenticeship, 
which is where a person or child is compelled to labor against their will 
for the benefit of another, ostensibly to learn a particular trade.90 After 
the period of servitude, the person is free, perhaps to practice the trade 
for their own benefit or take on their own apprentices.91 Thus, involun-
tary servitude may be a temporary condition, after which the stain of ser-
vitude is removed and no longer socially recognized. 
In contrast, slavery, under our traditional narrative, was for life. 
Slavery could be inherited, such that an African-American could be born 
and die as a slave, never knowing any other status. As applied to prison-
ers, it could be argued that prisoners are not always sentenced to life and 
that their status within the prison, even if appearing slave-like, is more 
like involuntary servitude. The length of their degraded status, under this 
argument, is entirely dependent on the sentence received at the end of 
their criminal trial. 
Another supposed distinction between slavery and involuntary ser-
vitude is the legal ownership of the enslaved versus the compulsion by 
nonlegal methods (e.g., quasi-contractual or psychological) of involun-
tary servants. Focusing solely on this formalistic distinction ignores the 
broader differential effects of law upon the enslaved. The role of law is 
important for a rich understanding of slavery, not as a formal matter, but 
because law undergirds and reinforces social death. 
                                                 
 87. See Bailey, 219 U.S. at 243 (noting that “peonage, however created, is compulsory service, 
involuntary servitude”). 
 88. See Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84 
NW. U. L. REV. 480, 483–84 (1990). 
 89. See Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=166 
6967. 
 90. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872). 
 91. See VanderVelde, supra note 81, at 878. 
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Slavery cannot exist without a legal structure that maintains the ob-
ligation of a slave to serve the master.92 In this case, it is the law that 
provides the compulsion, instead of the compulsion by a private actor. 
Whereas in cases of involuntary servitude the servant must justifiably 
believe there is no alternative other than service, in slavery there simply 
is no other alternative, as the law stands ready to enforce the obligation. 
Not only is the law used for enforcement but it also differentiates 
punishment based on a person’s enslaved status. Prior to the Civil War, 
the law provided a different set of punishments for violations of the law 
for those legally designated as slaves.93 After the Civil War, prisoners 
could be whipped and beaten under authority of law for any supposed 
transgression.94 In modern times, an inmate may be subject to additional 
punishments (e.g., segregation, revocation of privileges, etc.) for com-
mitting the same crime as a person who is not imprisoned, and acts that 
normally are not considered a “crime,” such as failure to work, become 
disciplinary violations within the prison walls and thereby punishable by 
the prison administration.95 
Compared to involuntary servitude, the law plays a more significant 
role in slavery even beyond the primary functions of enforcement and 
punishment. Law structures the rights and obligations of one person to 
another and of the government to individuals. By law, slaves were, 
among other things, forbidden to marry by choice, unable to conclude 
contracts, and noncognizable as witnesses testifying in a court of law.96 
Involuntary servants, however, retained their full panoply of rights once 
beyond their master’s control of their economic productivity (i.e., after 
their term of service).97 For slaves, all rights and duties flowed either to 
                                                 
 92. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (“It is true that slavery cannot exist without 
law any more than property in lands and goods can exist without law.”). 
 93. Slaves were more often subjected to “plantation justice” (i.e., the judgment of the owner), 
instead of judgment in a court of law. But the rare cases of criminal prosecution for slaves indicate a 
different set of punishments than for those not designated as slaves. MARK T. CARLETON, POLITICS 
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 94. See BLACKMON, supra note 41, at 71. 
 95. See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 39 (2002) (“An essential tool of prison administration, 
however, is the authority to offer inmates various incentives to behave. The Constitution accords 
prison officials wide latitude to bestow or revoke these perquisites as they see fit.”); Sandin v. Con-
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 96. See generally tenBroek, supra note 28, at 171 (summarizing the prohibitions facing slaves 
at the time of the Thirteenth Amendment). 
 97. See A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN 
LEGAL SYSTEM: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 352–55 (1978). 
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or through their master.98 For indentured servants, there remained an in-
dependent authority—the contract and the will of the state to enforce it 
beyond the master, through whom rights and duties were perfected.99 
D. Social Death as a Concept 
The key difference between slavery and involuntary servitude is the 
social death of the unwilling laborer. Orlando Patterson has argued that 
slavery is unique in its imposition of social death.100 Based on his com-
parative study of over 180 separate slave societies around the world, Pat-
terson argues that a distinguishing characteristic of slavery as compared 
to other forms of forced labor is the social death of the slave.101 Social 
death is the alienation or exclusion of the slave from the community at 
large justified by the general unworthiness of the slave.102 Social death 
may be accomplished through law, such as through the lack of legal 
recognition of a slave’s genealogical relationships (ascendants and de-
scendants).103 But it may also be accomplished through repetitive prac-
tices, rituals, and symbols denoting unworthiness and, ultimately, social 
banishment.104 It is these symbolic interactions and relationships of dom-
ination culminating in social death that fundamentally distinguish slavery 
from involuntary servitude. Forced plantation labor is culturally signifi-
cant in the American narrative of slavery.105 Penal plantation labor arose 
as a method to reimpose slavery following enactment of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.106 In modern times and as practiced, it lacks any rehabilita-
                                                 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Patterson rejects the traditionally American characteristics of chattel slavery (race and 
proprietary rights) as the primary denominators of slavery. See PATTERSON, supra note 6, at vii–xiii, 
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 106. David M. Oshinsky, Convict Labor in the Post-Civil War South: Involuntary Servitude 
After the Thirteenth Amendment, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY, supra note 35, at 100–16. 
2012]  Slavery Revisited in Penal Plantation Labor 887 
tive value and in fact may actually delay a prisoner’s reintegration into 
society even when freed.107 When a prisoner is forced to labor on a plan-
tation, he is ritually marked as enslaved. 
The cultural symbols of exclusion and degradation symbolic of so-
cial death produce a stigma of inferiority. Charles R. Lawrence III, in his 
seminal article on unconscious racism,108 has argued that the cultural 
meaning of an act or practice is a better predictor of underlying racism 
than the intent requirement announced in Washington v. Davis.109 Al- 
though his analysis focuses on the Fourteenth Amendment,110 his general 
proposition on the influence of culture is still relevant to distinguishing 
slavery from involuntary servitude. When an act “conveys a symbolic 
message,” the act draws on a shared language of symbols and culture 
developed over time.111 An act may stigmatize an individual or group and 
produce unique harms beyond those contemplated by the act. Much like 
social death, the stigma both “assault[s] a person’s self-respect and hu-
man dignity” and “brands the individual” as inferior and outcast.112 In 
cases of slavery, we are confronted with the most extreme form of stigma 
possible, namely, social death. 
Although a prisoner may not be a slave for life, as Orlando Patter-
son notes, slavery as an institution is not just about the static existence of 
a slave but rather about the processes associated with maintaining the 
institution.113 The potential access to eventual freedom molds the institu-
tion, creating incentives, and indeed, justifying the existence of slavery 
as a practice. Patterson’s argument makes practical sense, particularly in 
this day and age of longer sentences and mandatory terms for habitual 
offenders. For an inmate sentenced to twenty or forty years, the fact that 
at some point he may eventually seek parole or release at the end of the 
term in fact aids the maintenance of his confinement and labor, creating 
                                                 
 107. See infra notes 120–21 and accompanying text. 
 108. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Uncon-
scious Racism, 39 STAN L. REV. 317 (1987). 
 109. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (creating an intent requirement for allegations 
of disparate impact under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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 111. Lawrence, supra note 108, at 355–62. 
 112. Id. at 351. 
 113. PATTERSON, supra note 6, at 217. 
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incentives toward participation in labor that would otherwise be consid-
ered slavery. 
Historically, the use of symbols and rituals in slavery branded or 
marked the servant as a slave. As such, those particular practices, sym-
bols, or rituals assume a particular significance when invoked in modern-
day prisons. Accordingly, the history of slavery in a specific place be-
comes relevant when determining if the prison, by forcing an inmate to 
labor in a certain way, has fostered the social death of the inmate. 
Adopting Orlando Patterson’s framework into our understanding of 
the definition of slavery largely avoids the difficulties inherent in the 
previously described frameworks. By focusing on the harm to be avoided 
rather than the condition of slavery or the legal formality of slavery, the 
actual situations to be prohibited are much clearer. 
E. Social Death in the Modern Era 
All convicts, whether laboring on state-run plantations or not, expe-
rience a degree of social death. Their ability to meaningfully participate 
in our democracy is severely curtailed while serving a sentence of pun-
ishment. For example, states may preclude inmates from voting114 and 
organizing unions.115 But the harm suffered by certain inmates working 
on penal plantations is the dignitary harm of being made into a slave, 
laboring in similar conditions as generations prior, and being made prop-
erty, even if it is property of the state. To be made slaves again is to strip 
inmates of their basic human dignity and to “treat members of the human 
race as nonhumans.”116 
Moreover, the punishment of degradation, of being enslaved and 
thereby excluded, is contrary to our professed (even if confused) 
penological goals of retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabili-
tation.117 While retribution still plays a role in our criminal justice sys-
tem, retribution nevertheless has limits. Our laws do not permit torture as 
a legitimate form of retributive punishment because “[e]ven the vilest 
                                                 
 114. See generally Deborah Parks, Ballot Boxes Behind Bars: Toward Repeal of Felon Disen-
franchisement Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 71 (2003) (summarizing state felon disen-
franchisement laws, and arguing that prisoners should not lose the right to vote while completing 
their sentences). 
 115. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977). 
 116. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting that the 
rack and the screw are considered cruel and unusual punishments because of their fundamental inju-
ry to human dignity). 
 117. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010) (holding that life without parole sentenc-
es for crimes committed as a juvenile violated the Eighth Amendment, and “none of the goals of 
penal sanctions that have been recognized as legitimate—retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation provides an adequate justification”). 
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criminal remains a human being possessed of common human digni-
ty.”118 
Imposing slavery also fails to serve the goal of deterrence. First, the 
punishment of slavery status does not depend on the crime of conviction 
and could apply to prisoners convicted of robbery as well as murder. By 
sweeping so broadly, slavery as punishment loses any deterrent effect it 
might have had if targeted to a particular class of crimes. Second, deter-
rence is undermined by the pronounced racial dynamics in the modern 
operation of prisons, whereby minority racial groups are significantly 
overrepresented in prison populations.119 Accordingly, members of these 
groups may instead believe that, whether or not they commit criminal 
acts, the purpose of prison is simply to codify their enslaved status. 
Last, slavery status undermines the goals of rehabilitation because 
prisoners experience feelings of injustice as they undergo a punishment 
ordered by a prison administrator120 rather than a sentencing judge. As 
Foucault wrote, when the administrator’s power seems arbitrary—when 
the prisoner is “exposed in this way to suffering, which the law has nei-
ther ordered nor envisaged, [the prisoner] becomes habitually angry 
against everything around him; he sees every agent of authority as an 
executioner; he no longer thinks that he was guilty: he accuses justice 
itself.”121 Such attitudes detract from the promise of rehabilitation and 
the potential contribution of a prisoner once he rejoins society. 
The public, in discussing when and how slave status attaches, may 
find that it is connected to the nation’s (or even the specific region’s) 
historical practice of slavery. The dominant American narrative of slav-
ery is chattel slavery as practiced in the South at the time of the Civil 
War.122 The Southern economy, based on the production of raw goods 
for shipment to the manufacturing centers in the North, profited from the 
large-scale enslavement of individuals working the agricultural fields for 
cotton, soybeans, sugar, and row crops.123 To maintain slavery as an in-
stitution, both the laws and culture demonized the slave and beatified the 
                                                 
 118. Furman, 408 U.S. at 273. 
 119. See Catherine London, Racial Impact Statements: A Proactive Approach to Discussing 
Racial Disparities in Prison Populations, 29 LAW & INEQUALITY 211, 213–23 (2011) (summarizing 
current inequalities in prison populations by race). 
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 121. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF PRISON 266 (1976). 
 122. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872). 
 123. See generally Paul Finkelman, The First Federal Human Rights Legislation: Suppressing 
the African Slave Trade, 3 THE CRIT 20 (2010) (discussing the politics and economics of ending 
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owner.124 Slavery, according to this narrative, attached to African-
Americans by virtue of their race.125 Yet, other narratives and experienc-
es may also be salient in considering when a particular type of work is so 
connected to our nation’s history of slavery that it mimics the social 
death experience.126 
Slavery in the United States was much more varied than the domi-
nant narrative of Southern-style plantation slavery suggests. Historically, 
the types of work performed—like mining for gold and laying railroad 
track—varied by region, as did the particular groups treated as slaves 
(e.g., Mexican and Chinese).127 The California Constitution of 1879, de-
spite its deliberate subordination of the Chinese by forbidding Chinese 
employment, specifically noted that “Asiatic coolieism is a form of hu-
man slavery.”128 The U.S. Supreme Court also specifically allowed for 
the possibility that Mexican peonage and Chinese “coolie” labor, for ex-
ample, could “develop” into slavery.129 Without dismissing or denigrat-
ing these other experiences, it is clear that at least chattel slavery is a part 
of our American narrative on slavery. 
Unlike slavery, involuntary servitude was not racially defined; ser-
vitude did not automatically attach by virtue of belonging to a particular 
race or ethnic group.130 Indeed, involuntary servitude was expressly in-
cluded in the Thirteenth Amendment to encompass those types of com-
pelled labor where race was not the defining criterion.131 The U.S. Su-
preme Court has noted that involuntary servitude was intended to free all 
types of labor—from the English practice of debt servitude to the bond-
age of newly arrived immigrants paying for their passage to America.132 
The architects of the Thirteenth Amendment, by adding the term invol-
                                                 
 124. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 25. 
 125. See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 69 (referring to slavery as only “African slav-
ery”). 
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 132. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911) (holding an Alabama peonage statute un-
constitutional). 
2012]  Slavery Revisited in Penal Plantation Labor 891 
untary servitude, sought to erase more than slavery as it was practiced 
prior to the Amendment. Instead, the Amendment sought to maintain a 
free labor supply, no matter how or why the labor was compelled.133 
Although the dominant American narrative of slavery is the 
racialized assignment of slave status,134 the harm of social death in mod-
ern times affects prisoners of all races.135 From a public policy perspec-
tive, should the public be concerned about certain types of labor when 
performed by a group of Caucasian inmates who were not historically 
treated as slaves? Put differently, should we be concerned for all convicts 
performing the same type of labor? The harm at the heart of this argu-
ment is the social death and exclusion that result from an implied or ex-
plicit slave status. That stigma applies to all inmates who perform slave 
labor—not just those whose ancestors may indeed have been slaves. 
While historically slave status was race-dependent, slave status also in-
dependently denied a person’s humanity. Returning to our example of 
Caucasian inmates, their ideas are also shaped by slavery narratives, and 
therefore, the social death entailed is just as real for them as it is for Afri-
can-American inmates. 
The cultural meaning of plantation labor in America is the imposi-
tion of stigma to all participating inmates, regardless of their race. The 
imposition of that stigma, and the accompanying exclusion and social 
death, bestow an additional punishment on the prisoner beyond that met-
ed out by a judge. The punishment, likely not contemplated by either the 
sentencing judge or society in general, strips a prisoner’s humanity from 
him and recasts the prisoner as property of the state. 
 
                                                 
 133. Id. 
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III. THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT: INMATE LABOR AS CRUEL 
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
Beyond the Thirteenth Amendment, the differences between slav-
ery and involuntary servitude are also relevant under the Eighth Amend-
ment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.136 “The basic concept un-
derlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of 
man.”137 It is our “[r]espect for that dignity [that] animates the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”138 As a 
legal matter, there is little precedent for finding forced plantation labor to 
be cruel and unusual, as the majority of cases have focused on the indi-
vidual circumstances and capabilities of the prisoner–plaintiff. In addi-
tion, even where a punishment has no penological value, a prisoner–
plaintiff would have to show that prison officials knew of the harm—the 
imposition of slave status or social death—and were nevertheless “delib-
erately indifferent.”139 As a matter of public policy, however, the imposi-
tion of slave status may be considered cruel and unusual along the lines 
of Trop v. Dulles, where denationalization was deemed an unconstitu-
tional punishment. But unlike Trop, neither national nor international 
consensus is clear regarding the appropriateness of forced plantation la-
bor. 
A. Unconstitutional as Applied 
In general, courts have adopted a hands-off approach to the admin-
istration of prisons and the enforcement of inmate rights.140 Prisons may 
restrict the exercise of almost any constitutional right as long as it is 
“reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.”141 While “the 
Constitution does not require that every aspect of prison discipline serve 
a rehabilitative purpose,”142 punishments that are “totally without 
penological justification” may be deemed “unnecessary and wanton” and 
                                                 
 136. “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual 
punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend VIII. 
 137. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 
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 138. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011). 
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thereby prohibited.143 Mental harm is legally cognizable in prisoner law-
suits.144 In Farmer v. Brennan, an inmate alleged that prison officials 
were “deliberately indifferent” to the risk of violence and sexual assault 
and failed to adequately protect him from other inmates.145 The Court 
recognized that “shame, depression, and a shattering loss of self-esteem” 
constituted a cognizable harm under the Eighth Amendment.146 
To date, inmates have had little success in arguing that forced plan-
tation labor is cruel and unusual punishment. But the lack of success is 
based in part on the nature of the claim raised. Inmates have focused on 
the actual conditions of the work, rather than the type of work performed 
and the unique harms that flow from certain types of work. In short, pris-
oner claims of enslavement on penal plantations are treated as individual 
claims under the framework first established in Estelle v. Gamble in 
1976.147 
Under the Gamble framework, a prisoner must prove two distinct 
elements.148 First, as an objective matter, the inmate must show that he 
suffered a deprivation that was “sufficiently serious.”149 Successful 
claims have focused on the denial of basic necessities, such as food, 
medical care, or sanitary living conditions, which resulted in a “substan-
tial risk of serious harm.”150 Second, the prisoner must demonstrate that 
prison administration officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of 
mind” such as “deliberate indifference.”151 To prove “deliberate indiffer-
ence,” an inmate must show that the administrator had an actual aware-
ness or knowledge of the risk of harm.152 
The standard establishes a high bar for inmate claims of unconstitu-
tional conditions. It is designed to separate aspects of confinement that 
are unpleasant from those that are unconstitutional by requiring not just 
                                                 
 143. See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 853 
(1994) (discussing that rape or other forms of inmate violence serve no penological justification 
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 145. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 853. 
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 150. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. 
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proof of an injury (or risk thereof) but also subjective knowledge of the 
injury by a prison official.153 
Courts apply the Gamble framework when a prisoner challenges the 
execution of “otherwise constitutional punishments.”154 Here, the Consti-
tution provides for involuntary servitude, such as labor for the benefit of 
another, as a constitutional punishment. In terms of penal plantation la-
bor, an inmate would have to allege not only the injury occasioned by 
enslavement but also that prison officials actually knew of the risk of 
injury and failed to act. 
Forced penal labor has been deemed unconstitutional only when the 
labor is “cruel and unusual” because it is beyond a particular inmate’s 
strength. For example, in Jackson v. Cain, the Fifth Circuit upheld an 
inmate’s claim challenging a work assignment that was beyond his phys-
ical capacity.155 Jackson was forced to work 106 days of hard labor in the 
sun while he underwent treatment for syphilis.156 The Fifth Circuit held 
that “[i]f prison officials knowingly put Jackson on a work detail which 
they knew would significantly aggravate his serious physical ailment 
such a decision would constitute deliberate indifference to serious medi-
cal needs.”157 
In the U.S. Supreme Court, only a dissent by Justice Douglas in the 
case Sweeney v. Woodall supports the argument that forced agricultural 
labor by inmates may constitute cruel and unusual punishment.158 In 
Sweeney, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for a habeas petition from 
an African-American inmate who had escaped from Alabama but been 
recaptured in Ohio. The inmate alleged that conditions in Alabama pris-
ons constituted cruel and inhuman punishment.159 Justice Douglas argued 
in dissent that, if true, the inmate’s claim that he was “stripped to his 
waist and forced to work in the broiling sun all day without a rest period” 
would constitute cruel and inhuman punishment.160 
More generally, some punishments may be unconstitutional as ap-
plied, even if not generally prohibited. For example, solitary confinement 
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is constitutionally permissible but may become impermissible in its exe-
cution.161 In Gates v. Collier, a Fifth Circuit case cited by the Supreme 
Court, inmates were punished by being placed naked and alone in dark 
cells without adequate food, heat, or opportunities for hygiene for con-
tinuous periods lasting more than twenty-four hours.162 But courts have 
held solitary confinement constitutional when the prison supplies the 
basic necessities of life (e.g., clothing, food, and hygiene).163 
If we think about the various types of agricultural labor, the Gates 
analysis supports the argument that in some situations forced inmate la-
bor is cruel and unusual, but in others it is not. Plantation labor typically 
involves large-scale operations covering hundreds or even thousands of 
acres. Enslaved inmates harvest the crops in lines from one end of the 
row to the next. Decisions on planting (e.g., when and which crops to 
plant or when and which rows to harvest) are solely the province of the 
overseer without any decision-making authority by the enslaved. Quotas 
for harvest are enforced by the master who also has authority to extend 
additional punishments for nonproduction or other deemed “offenses.” 
But not all penal agricultural labor is the same. For example, imag-
ine a voluntary prison farm in which prisoners farm individual or small-
group plots, perhaps even organically. Prisoners would make the deci-
sions on which crops to seed, maintain, or harvest. One could imagine 
tasking each inmate with responsibility for maintaining a small section of 
farm land from which an inmate would be allowed to sell any proceeds 
to the state. Such farms do not produce the dehumanization of the pris-
oner, as an inmate is empowered with decision-making authority regard-
ing his plot of land and provided incentives and knowledge to make use 
of that authority. Given the current renaissance of community garden 
farming in urban areas,164 the skills learned at such farms, unlike the 
plantation farms, could be useful once a prisoner is released. In such sit-
uations, where the critical elements of plantation labor are absent, the 
cultural and ritual imposition of social death would be avoided. 
Being designated and treated as a slave—property of the state, 
much as an inmate’s ancestors were property of private owners—has no 
penological purpose. While a state may make use of an inmate’s eco-
nomic productivity for the term of the sentence, there is no additional 
penal value in rebranding an inmate as property instead of as human. The 
                                                 
 161. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1304 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 162. Id. at 1304–05. 
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social death of the inmate is not intrinsic to either the retributive or reha-
bilitative goals of the prison. Nor is an inmate’s social death an essential 
element of the state’s interest in recouping the costs of incarceration. In 
addition, the harm of re-branding may produce many of the same effects 
decried in Farmer, such as depression and loss of honor. 
B. Per Se Unconstitutionality 
At the core of the Eighth Amendment is a protection of basic hu-
man dignity beyond the actual conditions of the forced labor. Human 
dignity is not a static concept. Rather, human dignity is tied to contempo-
rary and evolving standards of human decency.165 Courts take contempo-
rary values into account in deciding whether a particular punishment vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment.166 
Punishments that were socially acceptable in the past can become 
legally cognizable as cruel and unusual as societal values change over 
time. Hope v. Pelzer provides the most recent nondeath-penalty example 
of a formerly accepted practice becoming unconstitutional.167 In Hope, 
the Court held that “cuffing an inmate to a hitching post for a period of 
time extending past that required to address an immediate danger or 
threat” violated the Eighth Amendment.168 Although torture, the rack and 
the screw were formerly considered appropriate punishments, but mod-
ern concepts of decency no longer permit these punishments.169 These 
punishments, as well as the punishment of Larry Hope in Alabama, result 
in treatment “antithetical to human dignity.”170 As such, certain penal 
punishments may be found per se unconstitutional.171 
A punishment may also become cruel and unusual under the Eighth 
Amendment even when it does not inflict physical harm, as in Trop v. 
Dulles.172 In Trop, a U.S. soldier was stripped of his American citizen-
ship, pursuant to statute, as punishment for desertion while overseas.173 
The U.S. Supreme Court held that denationalization as punishment for a 
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crime is “cruel and unusual punishment” and therefore per se unconstitu-
tional.174 
Indeed, the Trop Court’s reasoning as to the harm of denationaliza-
tion is strikingly similar to the harm of social death imposed by penal 
plantation labor. Denationalization involves the “total destruction of the 
individual’s status in organized society.”175 “[T]he expatriate has lost the 
right to have rights.”176 The denationalized individual—due to his ex-
pelled status—is “subject[] . . . to a fate of ever-increasing fear and dis-
tress”177 and without any guarantee of protection under the law. Similar-
ly, a prisoner branded a slave through forced plantation labor is deemed 
no longer human. The prisoner becomes de facto property of the state. 
An enslaved prisoner is subject to the same fears as in Trop, that his des-
ignation as “slave” will entail the loss of other essential rights and pro-
tections under the law. 
The punishments in Trop and Farmer, for example, were deemed 
excessive or disproportionate according to “evolving standards of human 
decency.”178 To evaluate whether the punishment violates contemporary 
values, courts must assess objective indicia of consensus that the chal-
lenged practice is cruel and unusual. Objective indicia include looking at 
state laws and practice and evaluating the consistency and coherency of 
trends disallowing the punishment.179 In addition, the U.S. Supreme 
Court has looked to its own judgment, particularly in the death penalty 
cases, on whether the punishment is disproportionate.180 
The national consensus supporting forced prisoner labor in general 
appears relatively clear. The American Bar Association (ABA) has rec-
ommended that “each sentenced prisoner should be employed substan-
tially full-time unless there has been an individualized determination that 
no work assignment . . . is consistent with security and safety.”181 Unlike 
the federal Prisoner Industry Enhancement Program, the ABA does not 
require that the work be voluntary.182 States are partnering with private 
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corporations to use forced prison labor to produce a wide range of 
goods.183 
But the national consensus is more opaque when it comes to forced 
plantation labor. The ABA standards on the treatment of prisoners allow 
for “agricultural” work assignments but simultaneously note that all 
work assignments should “teach vocational skills . . . , instill a work eth-
ic, and . . . respect prisoners’ human dignity.”184 Forced plantation labor, 
by denoting an inmate a slave, would certainly conflict with the ABA’s 
concern for human dignity. In part, a national consensus is harder to dis-
cern because of the lack of transparency on exactly what type of work 
prisoners perform. Local prison administrators make most decisions 
about prison operations, including labor, under a general grant of authori-
ty from the state.185 Each facility usually decides whether to force prison-
ers to work plantation farms in conjunction with the state’s prison enter-
prise office; this decision depends on the land available, the economics 
of the practice, the facility’s needs, and other factors.186 In short, much of 
the public is probably unaware of the prevalence of forced plantation 
labor unless someone has a relative or friend among the incarcerated. 
International consensus appears similar to our national consensus 
that generally allows for forced penal labor, but ambiguous regarding 
forced plantation labor. Eighth Amendment jurisprudence allows consid-
eration of the values of the international community to determine “evolv-
ing standards of decency.”187 In particular, the Court has been partial to 
evidence from nations with a similar background and approach in law, 
such as those with an “Anglo-American heritage” or the “Western Euro-
pean community.”188 While international law is not controlling, the Court 
has consistently found international law instructive in construing whether 
or not a punishment was cruel and unusual.189 
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Under international law, slavery is absolutely prohibited.190 The 
Slavery Convention of 1926 prohibited slavery in all its forms, and slav-
ery has since attained jus cogens status.191 The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights goes even further, declaring that “no one shall be held in 
slavery or servitude.”192 Both the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights absolutely pro-
hibit slavery, but similar to U.S. law, discussed supra Part II, the conven-
tions allow for forced prisoner labor like involuntary servitude.193 In 
terms of prison labor, the key distinguishing factor appears to be whether 
forced prison labor is contracted out for profit-making enterprises. In this 
respect, the United States appears to be one of only nine countries that 
explicitly facilitates the practice of forcing prisoners to work for profit.194 
The International Labor Organization, concerned with the privatization 
of prisons and forced prison labor for private corporations, specifically 
has requested reports from each of the member states regarding their 
domestic practices.195 
There is little national or international evidence regarding the ap-
propriateness of forced plantation labor. While it could certainly be ar-
gued that there is a clear consensus that slavery should never be imposed, 
it is decidedly unclear if international consensus supports the prohibition 
of forced plantation labor as slavery. In any event, the international evi-
dence is not as strong as in Trop, where the Court confronted a clear and 
uncompromising stance against imposed statelessness. 
The lack of visible consensus on the inappropriateness of forced 
plantation labor is not the end of the discussion but rather the beginning. 
By rediscovering the aims of the Eighth and Thirteenth Amendments, it 
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is possible to have a broader conversation about which types of work 
should be considered appropriate for prisoners and which types of work, 
because of their cultural meaning and imposition of social death, society 
should forever prohibit. The first step in that conversation is distinguish-
ing between slavery and involuntary servitude; the second is applying 
that framework to the history and operation of penal plantations in the 
United States. 
IV. MODERN SLAVE PLANTATIONS: LOUISIANA 
Distinguishing between slavery and involuntary servitude is not just 
a remnant of the past but also remains vitally important in today’s correc-
tional institutions. In Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas, prison 
administrators force inmates to pick cotton and work plantation-style row 
crops.196 “Prisons in Arizona, California, Washington, Utah, Montana 
and Idaho now deploy inmates to do agricultural work.”197 Similarly, in 
Colorado, prisoners now farm plantation-style crops due to a state-wide 
labor shortage because of new restrictive law that penalizes the employ-
ment of undocumented workers.198 
These penal plantations are not a modern invention but rather arose 
in the aftermath of the Civil War as a means to retain slavery as an insti-
tution and continue the subordination of Africans.199 Following the Civil 
War, a number of states passed the so-called Black Codes or “Pig Laws” 
to create or enhance criminal penalties for misdemeanors.200 State legis-
latures created new offenses, such as leaving an employer’s land or re-
fusing to fulfill a contract.201 As a result, the prison population in most of 
these states increased dramatically, producing an inmate labor force in 
service to the state.202 To understand the direct links between today’s 
penal plantation labor and slavery, we, as a society, must trace the histo-
ry of penal plantations to understand the cultural and ritual symbols of 
modern-day social death.203 
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A. The Origins of Prison Labor in Louisiana 
The use of convict labor began well before the end of the Civil 
War. Louisiana built its first state penitentiary in 1837 in Baton Rouge 
after decades of housing prisoners in local parish jails.204 In 1844, the 
state government agreed to cede management and operation of the peni-
tentiary through a lease contract with James MacHatton and William 
Pratt.205 The contract lease agreement provided that the lessees would 
operate the penitentiary, including paying all costs relating to the upkeep 
of inmates, in return for use of convict labor inside and outside of the 
prison walls.206 
An indignant Senate report stated that before the Civil War, the ma-
jority of Louisiana convicts were Caucasian but were treated “like 
slaves.”207 Most African-Americans, as slaves, faced “plantation justice” 
instead of the state criminal justice system.208 
After the capture and burning of the Baton Rouge penitentiary by 
Union forces during the Civil War, the Louisiana government continued 
to rely on lessees to clothe, house, guard, and feed inmates who were 
then scattered all over the state.209 In 1868, the then Commanding Gen-
eral of Louisiana, General Hancock, signed a lease with John M. Huger 
and Charles Jones to operate the penitentiary, including the use of inmate 
labor.210 Lessees such as Huger and Jones—whose every expenditure on 
basic goods for inmates reduced their profits—had little incentive to pro-
vide minimal care for inmates.211 Convicts in Louisiana were leased to 
railroad companies, as well as levee construction teams and plantations, 
including one owned by a local parish judge.212 
But after the Civil War, the demographics of the Louisiana prison 
population changed dramatically. Over half of Louisiana’s population 
was “freed” through the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863 and the Un-
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ion victory in the Civil War in 1865.213 In 1865, the Louisiana legislature 
began drafting discriminatory laws against “freedmen,” more familiarly 
known as the Black Codes.214 Legislative drafting committees prepared 
legislation that would make freedmen labor “available to the agricultural 
interests of the State” and “protect the State 
from . . . support[ing] . . . minors, vagrants, and paupers.”215 For exam-
ple, the legislature changed the punishment for vagrancy from short-term 
imprisonment to being hired out for labor on public construction projects 
or private lands for up to a year.216 In addition to the statewide laws 
passed in December 1865, many local municipalities enacted ordinances 
that banned African-Americans from entering city limits or selling items 
without permission from the mayor.217 The objective of the Black Codes 
according to one Louisiana republican was “getting things back as near 
to slavery as possible.”218 
As of 1868, the impact of the Civil War and the Black Codes was 
apparent in Louisiana’s statewide prison population: 85 Caucasian males, 
203 African-American males, and 9 African-American women.219 Pro-
fessor Mark Carleton, who has published the only definitive history of 
Louisiana State Penitentiary, notes that although specific race-to-crime 
ratios are unavailable, the majority of inmates were African-American 
and the majority of inmates were sentenced to terms of four months to 
one year for crimes “no [more] serious than larceny.”220 Although pris-
ons still included Caucasian inmates, anecdotal evidence from 1880 sug-
gests that prison guards permitted Caucasian convicts to take more 
breaks and work slower than African-American inmates because the 
Caucasian convicts were “not used to hard labor” like clearing land for 
plantations.221 
The radical change in Louisiana’s inmate demographics may have 
contributed to the brutality of the convict-lease system. Scores of inmates 
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died under convict-leasing.222 Commenting on the use of prison labor 
across the south in 1883, one interviewee noted, 
Before the war we owned the negroes. If a man had a good negro, 
he could afford to take care of him: if he’s sick, get a doctor. He 
might even get gold plugs in his teeth. But these convicts; we don’t 
own ‘em. One dies, get another.223 
Convicts, sentenced for crimes ranging from fraud to arson, would march 
for miles from one work site to the next, working from sunrise to sun-
set.224 Each year between 1894 and 1901, an estimated 10% of convicts 
incarcerated in Louisiana died.225 Those that didn’t die could be severely 
injured. Theophile Chevalier, an African-American inmate sentenced to 
five years for stealing five dollars, lost both of his feet to gangrene while 
forced to work outside without shoes in 1884.226 The post-Civil War his-
tory of Louisiana clearly demonstrates that penal plantation labor is an 
outgrowth of slavery as practiced before Emancipation. 
B. Angola as a Penal Plantation 
The convict-lease system ended on January 1, 1901, as required by 
the 1898 constitutional convention. Up until this point, prison reform 
efforts tried and failed, for over a decade, to secure legislation that would 
end convict-leasing in Louisiana.227 Profit, however, succeeded where 
prison reformers failed. During this time, the Board of Control faced in-
creasing difficulty collecting payments from the lessee, a former Confed-
erate, Major Samuel James.228 In 1875, Louisiana sued Major James to 
recover $50,000 in past due payments, but the case never went to trial, 
and the parties eventually settled.229 Greed, not lack of revenue, preclud-
ed payment. In 1870, Major James had concluded “half a million dollars 
worth of business.”230 Indeed, Major James worked the inmates on his 
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own property, including his own Angola and Laguna plantations.231 By 
1901, the cost of maintaining approximately 1076 convicts was approxi-
mately $200,000.232 Given Major James’s profits in 1870, the state and 
the general public expected a net profit from resuming operational con-
trol of the penitentiary.233 
The constitutional convention mandating state control of the con-
vict-lease system eliminated only the private lessee. Very little else 
changed. After the state resumed control, inmates still labored on levees, 
plantations, and road construction.234 Even the personnel responsible for 
overseeing prisoner labor remained the same. Members of the newly cre-
ated State Penitentiary Board (created at the end of convict-leasing in 
1901 to assume administration of the penitentiary) and penitentiary staff 
were primarily recent employees of the most recent leaseholder, the son 
of Major Samuel James.235 
Nor did state control of inmates lead to construction of a new peni-
tentiary. Rather, the state simply purchased the Angola plantation from 
Major James.236 Prisoners were housed in the old slave quarters and 
worked in the now state-owned cotton fields.237 
Although the state constitution supposedly abolished the convict- 
lease system, the state would nevertheless continue to lease its predomi-
nately African-American inmates to private employees for another fif-
teen years.238 
It was only when Angola fully developed its sugar cane industry 
that African-American convicts were permanently reincorporated into 
the inmate labor force within the prison walls of Angola.239 Sugar cane 
and cotton dominated Angola’s 18,000 acre plantation until 1960 when 
many of the fields were converted to row crops of vegetables.240 
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The development of the state penal plantation directly related to the 
end of slavery. Ninety percent of all inmates in Louisiana were black in 
1901.241 The dominant discourse of a still racially segregated America 
perceived the penal plantation as beneficial for African-American in-
mates. A national prison reform advocate praised the penal plantation as 
particularly well-suited for dealing with the “negro [who] is not fitted for 
indoor life.”242 Newspaper editors exclaimed that the Angola plantation 
“has brought the convict Negro out of a thralldom worse than slavery 
into a condition of moral and physical well-being that has never been 
known in the history of the Southern States.”243 Indeed, the state penal 
farm, according to one newspaper account, was preferred to freedom by 
African-Americans in the South because the farm always offered a “com-
fortable bed and good food.”244 
C. Plantation Labor as Punishment 
Profit—and not rehabilitation, retribution, or deterrence—became 
the guiding penological goal of Louisiana State Penitentiary.245 Prison 
administration policies long relied on inmates to produce a financial 
profit, or at least make the penitentiary self-sufficient (even when leased 
to private interests). The possibility of cheap labor and the influence of 
politician–farmers (whose operations had been threatened by the legal 
emancipation of slaves) led to a profit-oriented policy of inmate planta-
tion farming that closely mirrored slavery.246 
A 1923 state report to the governor made clear that profit was a 
primary penological goal. For instance, the report’s authors devoted the 
first five pages to detailing an inspection of the prison, focusing on the 
condition of the sugar mill, sugar cane, and cotton crops.247 Only a few 
lines were spared to discuss the condition of the 1596 inmates.248 By 
1940, of the 3127 inmates incarcerated, over half worked on the planta-
tion.249 The plantation, in addition to the limited operation of other facto-
ries on penitentiary grounds, produced commodities worth $1.3 million 
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dollars.250 Tellingly, in 1940, Angola listed zero inmates either as “at-
tending school” or “idle.”251 
Race remained an important touchstone in the operation of Angola. 
In 1937, for example, a federal government investigation recommended 
the construction of new dormitory housing.252 Specifically, the federal 
report noted that housing was required for “1000 negroes” for farm la-
bor.253 African-Americans continued to be a majority in Angola, consti-
tuting 52% of the inmates in 1953.254 During the 1950s, African-
Americans were three times more likely than Caucasians to be incarcer-
ated in Louisiana, despite being a minority statewide. 255 
It is unclear how mandatory plantation labor furthers Louisiana 
State Penitentiary’s stated penological aim of rehabilitating prisoners. 
The prison itself admitted as much. As early as 1956, an official publica-
tion of Angola noted, “At one time, about the only work available at An-
gola was labor in the cotton and sugar fields. This work could not help 
him [the prisoner] get a job when he left the prison, particularly since 
most of the prisoners came from city areas.”256 
By 1971, the state still had not adopted meaningful vocational train-
ing programs for all of its inmates. At that time, Angola maintained a 
large sugar mill and cane crops, and paid inmates only half a cent more 
than it had thirteen years earlier. 257 Indeed, as one former warden noted, 
During the sugar cane era [1967], everything existed to get that crop 
in. Wardens came and went based on what kind of cane harvest they 
produced. Academic, vocational, and recreational programs were 
simply not important. The only thing that mattered was whether that 
sugar mill rolled, because if it didn’t, then the officials did—right 
out the front gate.258 
The background of the majority of Angola’s inmates made agricultural 
training impractical as a vocation. Ninety-five percent of Angola’s in-
mates were from urban areas at that time.259 According to the warden of 
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Angola in 1971, the disconnect between the background of inmates and 
the focus on agricultural training was unavoidable.260 The Louisiana 
State Penitentiary was, he argued, “agriculturally oriented” and had diffi-
culty attracting qualified instructors for other trades to its remote loca-
tion.261 
Given the urban origins of most of the prisoners and the continued 
reliance on mandatory farm labor, profit still appears to undergird prison 
policies. In a section detailing the rehabilitative aspects of work and sci-
entific farming at Angola, an official penitentiary publication from 1956 
notes, 
Other [training] facilities will be added which will serve as training 
aids and also cut the expenses of these items to state institu-
tions . . . .The new farming and industrial program is good for the 
prisoners and also for the state. During the last fiscal year more than 
$1 million has been saved through these programs. More than 
$500,000 has been saved in the construction of the new prison 
buildings by the use of prison industries and labor.262 
Similarly, in the 1980s, a state official advocated expanding a small vo-
cational program to teach inmates how to work printing presses.263 
Through increased investments and greater inmate productivity, he pre-
dicted a larger prison printing program would produce a net profit for the 
state.264 
The current operation of the penal plantation of Angola is hidden 
from public view. The Louisiana State Penitentiary has refused my re-
peated requests for written documentation on policies and procedures 
governing field labor assignments and crop planting decisions.265 Cer-
tainly, the failure to provide documents further underscores the questions 
raised in this Article and raises questions of the unconscious objectives 
of plantation farming as punishment. If field labor has any penological, 
rehabilitative, or even institutional value, then releasing that information, 
as well as the procedures governing the field labor program, could in-
crementally mitigate the social death imposed on prisoners by such 
forced labor. In light of the lack of written information regarding the cur-
rent operation of the plantation farm program, this Article relies on both 
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older accounts of the modern era, newspaper reports, and current inter-
views with relatively recent prisoners.266 
Current Louisiana State Penitentiary policy requires that all new 
inmates must work in the field as their initial assignment for ninety days 
without a write-up for an infraction.267 After ninety days, the inmate may 
apply for other types of mandatory work available on the Angola proper-
ty.268 But as the Angolite—a magazine produced for and by Angola in-
mates—concludes, even if all inmates had perfect disciplinary records, 
there are not enough out-of-field jobs available for all of Angola’s in-
mates.269 Inmates view assignment to field labor, as compared to say the 
metal work factory, as punishment.270 Indeed, inmates claim they have 
been transferred to the field by the Disciplinary Board and individual 
administrators for disciplinary infractions.271 In the past, some inmates 
have alleged that they have applied for out-of-field jobs after the requi-
site period and have been rejected despite perfect records.272 
Burl Cain, the current warden of Angola, recently noted that Ango-
la is “like a big plantation in days gone by.”273 Currently, inmates at An-
gola farm cotton and soybeans, in addition to row crops of vegetables 
such as corn, squash, and watermelon.274 Norris Henderson, a former 
inmate and now civil rights advocate, notes that inmates still pick cotton 
by hand, despite the availability of modern machinery.275 Although An-
gola claims that most inmates work only eight hours a day, five days a 
week,276 one news report indicates that extending field duty as a punish-
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ment for disciplinary violations continues.277 It appears that prisoners are 
still expected to fill a daily harvest quota or risk punishment.278 Prisoners 
also have to fill a quota each day in the fields. Inmates, like Nathaniel 
Anderson, feel like slaves.279 “People on the outside should know that 
Angola is still a plantation with every type and kind of slave conceiva-
ble.”280 
Many of the initial justifications for mandatory farm labor in the 
early-twentieth century are repeated today. Prison officials say that field 
labor “is good therapy for prisoners and a meaningful attempt on the part 
of the administration to teach the inmates good work habits.”281 Warden 
Cain, declared in 1998 that mandatory field labor is 
good for morale in Angola because you start out with a ditch bank 
blade in the fields and can have illusions of grandeur that you might 
at some point get to drive a tractor . . . you come outside and you’re 
in the sunshine and you’re out here working and it’s good for you 
and feel like you’re healthier and you’re gonna live longer and it 
makes this business a little less violent too.282 
Of course, profit continues to play a role in the administration of the 
prison. Angola is home to a “multi-million dollar prison enterprise.”283 
According to Warden Cain, “You have to be a good businessman too to 
run this place.”284 At the same time, only 1% of the budget for Louisiana 
State Penitentiary is dedicated to rehabilitation programs.285 
Devoid of vocational or rehabilitative elements, the penal plantation 
at Angola is reminiscent of features of chattel slavery, which was formal-
ly abolished in 1865. Forcing African-American prisoners to pick cotton 
and soybeans for approximately thirty-two cents a day in modern times 
looks, smells, and feels like slavery. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
There are consequences to ignoring the imposition of slavery-like 
conditions on the incarcerated. Our criminal justice system depends in 
large part on the trust of the populace and is ideally presumed to be oper-
ating in good faith. From the reporting of crimes to the testimony of wit-
nesses to participation as a juror, society’s role is deeply embedded in the 
functioning of our criminal justice system. Creating slaves out of inmates 
undermines society’s trust and faith in our criminal justice system and 
ultimately lessens the government’s ability to protect society. Distrust of 
government motives in criminal prosecution grows when mothers see 
sons picking cotton on plantations, much like their great-grandparents 
may have done. 
The retention and reimposition of slave practices on convicted in-
mates implies that conditions of slavery can be a justifiable punishment 
for a crime. It implies that we as a society are entitled by virtue of the 
criminal act to remove one of the last vestiges of humanity from any per-
son serving a sentence. In so doing, we sever any moral or community 
obligation toward the inmate because he is deemed no longer human. 
Yet, when we do so, we also negate the promise of a democratic society. 
As former Chief Justice Warren Burger argued, 
[W]hen a sheriff or a marshal[] takes a man from the courthouse in 
a prison van and transports him to confinement for two or three or 
ten years, this is our act. We have tolled the bell for him. And 
whether we like it or not, we have made him our collective respon-
sibility. We are free to do something about him; he is not.286 
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